



basic education

Department:
Basic Education
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

**NATIONAL
SENIOR CERTIFICATE**

GRADE 12

**HISTORY P2
FEBRUARY/MARCH 2014
ADDENDUM**

This addendum consists of 15 pages.

QUESTION 1: WHAT POLITICAL CHANGES OCCURRED IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR?**SOURCE 1A**

This source outlines the reasons why the National Party government decided to negotiate with the African National Congress.

It was also in 1988 that Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev called for a 'new world order', and reconfirmed his commitment to glasnost and perestroika. Ronald Reagan, who in the previous year had met with Gorbachev to agree on reducing the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, visited Moscow. The Cold War thaw (softening) had set in. Within another year, Berliners would break down the dreaded symbol of the Iron Curtain, the Berlin Wall, and the 'Communist threat' – so long exploited by successive South African administrations – would lose its potency (effectiveness). This would have a significant bearing on South Africa.

Of more immediate importance was Nelson Mandela's move to a comfortable house on the prison grounds of Victor Verster prison, among the vineyards in the pretty Franschhoek Valley. It heightened public and international excitement about the prospect of his release.

[From: *Every Step Of The Way: The Journey To Freedom in South Africa*
by the Ministry of Education]

SOURCE 1B

This source consists of two newspaper articles that focus on the impact of De Klerk's speech of 2 February 1990.

Newspaper Article 1: This article appeared in the *Sunday Times* on 4 February 1990.

A PAGE HAS BEEN TURNED IN HISTORY

We awake on this summer Sabbath (Sunday) morn (morning) in a country where hope has displaced fear, despair and anger. Where there is a feeling that South Africans may yet have a decent chance of making it.

After decades of evading the truth, the hard, inescapable realities are at last being addressed with candour (honesty) and sincerity. A page of history has been turned and all of us, regardless of pigment or political persuasion, today confront a new future.

The public were amazed at the swiftness of De Klerk's actions, which were in marked contrast to those of his predecessor, whose Rubicon speech had sown despair in 1985.

Newspaper Article 2: The following headline appeared in the *Weekend Argus* on 3 February 1990.



[From: *A Newspaper History Of South Africa* by J Cameron-Dow]

SOURCE 1C

This source focuses on the reaction of the ANC to FW de Klerk's speech of 2 February 1990.

His announcements took the exiled ANC completely by surprise: unbanning the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the South African Communist Party; undertaking to free Nelson Mandela soon; lifting emergency restrictions on organisations such as the UDF and COSATU; releasing scores of political prisoners; lifting media restrictions; and declaring his government's commitment to creating a 'totally new and just dispensation' based on equality.

It was so unexpected, even out of character. De Klerk's saying the 'agenda is open' and the 'overall aims' included 'a new democratic constitution' and a 'universal franchise' seemed convincing enough with most in Lusaka and elsewhere seeing it as a genuine opportunity for open politics but others at first suspected it might be a ruse (deception). Their reaction reflected the decades of suspicion and mistrust born of the Nationalists' long indifference towards the black majority.

Perhaps the most optimistic (positive) voice was that of Thabo Mbeki. 'If Mr De Klerk says the time for talking has come,' the ANC's foreign affairs secretary said from Stockholm, 'we may be saying the same thing ourselves.' At home, Archbishop Desmond Tutu said De Klerk had 'taken my breath away'. Investors rewarded the President with an overnight boost on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange of R9 billion. In contrast to the international disdain (disregard) of preceding years, congratulations poured in from the world, even from United Nations secretary-general Xavier Perez de Cuellar.

[From: *Apartheid, An Illustrated History* by M Morris]

QUESTION 2: HOW DID THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR IN 1989 INFLUENCE ANGOLA IN RE-IMAGINING ITSELF?**SOURCE 2A**

The following excerpt indicates the situation in Angola after the end of the Cold War in 1989.

In Angola, as soon as the Cold War ended, the Americans began to organise a peace agreement as if the Angolan civil war had simply been an extension of the Cold War. The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) dropped the façade (front) of Marxist Leninism, and called an election. It was held in December 1992 and America backed UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) to win. The MPLA was declared the winner. Savimbi rejected the result and war restarted.

The Americans, realising Savimbi could not win, switched sides and began to help the MPLA win the war.

In the mid 1990s, anxious to secure Angolan oil, the US abandoned its previously stated mantra (view) that the war in Angola was not winnable by either side. Having changed sides, the Americans helped the government launch an offensive in 1999 to drive UNITA from its heartland in Central Angola. Abandoned by the Americans, it lost support outside Angola. In 1996 its main ally in Africa, President Mobutu Sese Seko of the Congo (Zaire), was overthrown. The Angolan army blocked supplies crossing the border. The Angolans bombed a power station in northern Zambia to warn the Zambian government of its support for UNITA.

[Adapted from: *Africa – Altered States, Ordinary Miracles* by Richard Dowden]

SOURCE 2B

The following is an account by Zeca Santana. He writes about corruption when he visited Angola in 1991.

Angola is a country so rich in mineral resources, but somehow, all of the revenues from oil (\$900 million monthly), diamonds (\$200 million monthly), and let's not forget, gold, copper, iron and other gems, never arrive at the national treasury in full measure. Angola's debt is worse now than it has ever been.

The year I first arrived on my first visit in 1991, it sobered (shocked) me to see how business was done. No project could get off the ground unless you gave a share of your business or enterprise to the minister overseeing that department. It was part of everyday life. To get my coffee ranches back, I had to pay the agricultural minister of the province of Bengo a \$1 000 fee, plus taxes. No receipt was given for the fee, only for the taxes. Not only was I asked to pay this fee, but I was told that this fee had to be paid in dollars. If a permit is needed for a new business, always a share of the business or a fee has to be paid to be able to obtain the permit. (This fee is not the fee paid for the permit itself; it is a fee for the chance to get a permit.)

[From: *Angola: Land Of Shattered Dreams* by Zeca Santana]

SOURCE 2C

The following source highlights the cartoonist's depiction of the various challenges that Angolans faced after 1990.



[Adapted from: *The Peaceful Face Of Angola* by Michael G Comerford]

QUESTION 3: WHAT OBSTACLES DID SOUTH AFRICA FACE DURING THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 1990 AND 1994?**SOURCE 3A**

This source focuses on the obstacles that confronted the National Party and the African National Congress when negotiations started during the 1990s.

The time for 'talks about talks' had now passed, and the pre-negotiation phase proper was about to be entered. The obstacles to negotiate had to be cleared away, which would involve formal meetings between government and ANC representatives.

The first such meeting took place at Groote Schuur, the historic Cape Town residence of the head of state, between 2 and 4 May 1990, but not before the first of many spats (difference of opinion) between De Klerk and Mandela. This arose out of the killing by the police of eight demonstrators in the troubled township of Sebokeng on 26 March. The police claimed that the 50 000-strong demonstration had been illegal and that they had been forced to defend themselves when fired upon; Mandela, on the other hand, contended that the demonstrators were unarmed and that most had been shot in the back while fleeing: 'This sort of action angered me like no other, and I told the press that every white policeman ... regarded every black person as a military target.' He announced the suspension of the talks, scheduled for 11 April, and warned De Klerk that he could not 'talk about negotiations on the one hand and murder our people on the other'.

[From: *The Rise And Fall Of Apartheid* by David Welsh]

SOURCE 3B

This photograph by Adil Bradlow (1992) shows the attitude of conservative white South Africans towards the referendum that De Klerk called for.



[From: *One Law, One Nation: The making of the South African Constitution* by L Segal et al]

SOURCE 3C

The following source focuses on how conservative South African leaders tried to stop the implementation of the Record of Understanding that was signed on 26 September 1992 at CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) in Johannesburg.

On 28 September, Lucas Mangope (leader of the Bophuthatswana Bantustan homeland) held talks with De Klerk to make plain his objections to the Record of Understanding. Three days later, he, Oupa Gqozo (leader of the Ciskei Bantustan homeland) and Mangosuthu Buthelezi (Chief Minister of KwaZulu) met in Mmabatho to discuss the situation. The three repudiated (rejected) the agreement and accused the government and the ANC of unilaterally (without consulting) deciding the parameters of future negotiations. They called for an urgent meeting of parties sharing their concerns to discuss the way forward.


The Conservative Party (CP) also rejected the Record of Understanding, saying that it was 'unacceptable duplicity' (betrayal) to ban traditional weapons while permitting the ANC to retain its numerous conceal arms caches (supply). According to the CP leader, Andries Treurnicht, De Klerk had 'caved in to overseas and ANC, South African Communist Party pressures' and had made a number of 'disastrous concessions'. Stressing that the country's destiny could not be decided by the government and the ANC alone, Treurnicht welcomed Buthelezi's similar perspective and called for joint action 'by those who refuse to live under ANC and SACP tyranny (dictatorship) or betrayal by the government'.

On 6 October a 'conference for concerned South Africans' was co-convened by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Gqozo and Mangope and attended by the CP and the Afrikaner-Volksunie ... It urged a halt to the implementing of the Record of Understanding and recommended the abolition of CODESA and its replacement by a more representative forum.

[From: *People's War* by A Jeffery]

SOURCE 3D

This cartoon by Higgins depicts South Africa's first democratic election in 1994.



[From: *Nelson Mandela: A Life In Cartoons* edited by H Dugmore et al]

QUESTION 4: HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) IN HEALING SOUTH AFRICA FROM ITS DIVIDED PAST?**SOURCE 4A**

This extract by the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, focuses on the reasons for the establishment of the TRC.

This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife (tension), conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future rounded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class or belief. The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society ...

There is a commitment to break from the past, to heal the wounds of the past, to forgive but not to forget and to build a future based on respect for human rights. This new reality in the human rights situation in South Africa places a great responsibility upon all of us. Human rights are not a gift handed down as a favour by government or state to loyal citizens. It is the right of each and every citizen. Part of our joint responsibility is to help to illuminate (clarify) the way, chart the road forward and provide South Africa with guidelines based on international experiences as we traverse (pass through) the transition. We must guard against dangers and pitfalls (difficulty)! We must involve our citizens in the debate so as to ensure that human rights are not the preserve of the few but the birth right of every citizen! We must embark upon the journey from the past, through our transition and into a new future.

[From: <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/legal/justice.htm>. Accessed on 14 January 2013]

SOURCE 4B

The following consists of a written source and a visual source about the trial of apartheid agent, Eugene de Kock.

Written Source: This is a report of an interview that was conducted with Eugene de Kock after his first appearance before the TRC in September 1997.

De Kock had been an 'implicated witness' in the TRC hearing of five white former security policemen in Port Elizabeth who were applying for amnesty for the bombing ... The 'Motherwell Bombing' was ordered by the commander of the police, General Nic van Rensburg, who had approached De Kock and asked him to 'make a plan' for silencing the Motherwell policemen.

De Kock set out first to design the plan and then to execute it. He approached the technical division of the Pretoria police and instructed them to build a bomb that could be exploded by remote control ... De Kock testified that the three black policemen were sent on a false mission in a car on which the explosives had secretly been planted. The bomb was set off as planned by remote control, killing the Motherwell policemen, as well as a fourth man, a friend who was in the car with them.


This was De Kock's first appearance before the TRC. As he concluded his testimony, he made an appeal to meet with the widows of the victims of the Motherwell bombing. He wanted to apologise to them but wished to do so privately, he said. I was intrigued by De Kock's request ...

The widows' lawyer agreed to the meeting ... 'I was profoundly touched by him,' Mrs Faku said of her encounter with De Kock. Both women (the widows) felt that De Kock had communicated to them something he felt deeply and had acknowledged their pain. 'I couldn't control my tears. I could hear him, but I was overwhelmed by emotion, and I was just nodding, as a way of saying yes, I forgive you. I hope that when he sees our tears, he knows that they are not only tears for our husbands, but tears for him as well ... I would like to hold him by the hand, and show him that there is a future, and that he can still change'.

[From: *A Human Being Died That Night* by P Gobodo-Madikizela]

Please turn over for the visual source

Visual Source: This cartoon by Zapiro depicts Eugene de Kock, Craig Williamson and Johan Coetzee as 'THE 3 TERRORS'.



[From: *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 Years On* by Charles Villa-Vicencio et al.]

SOURCE 4C

This source is an extract from an interview that Tim Modise, host of *Lekgotleng Le Modise* on SABC 2, conducted with Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu in April 2006.

Tim Modise: When you reflect on the TRC, Archbishop, would you say that the truth was told about human rights violations to the extent that everybody expected it to be told?

Desmond Tutu: We did get a fair amount of the truth. Many things we suspected were confirmed ... But we had those suspicions then and they have been confirmed. We have it from the horse's mouth, because when people applied for amnesty, in order to qualify they had to be the prosecutors of themselves and spill the beans. We did not have to accuse them. People whose loved ones disappeared almost without trace were able to go to secret graves and to view the remains of their loved ones ... Whatever the result of the amnesty application; the closure that family was able to experience is enough justification for the TRC.

That being said, you would be right to say that the big fish escaped. By and large we didn't really get the ones who gave the orders, we mainly got the ones who carried out the orders, and to that extent we did not succeed. We got a broad picture of that particular period, 1960 to 1994; enough so that, for instance, nobody in South Africa could ever again say, 'I did not know, I did not know.' The evidence is there: there were death squads; no one can deny that there was torture and so on, even in the camps of the ANC, the liberation movement, because they themselves provided that particular kind of evidence ...

[From: *Truth and Reconciliation In South Africa 10 Years On* by Charles Villa-Vicencio et al.]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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