

# NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE

**GRADE 12** 

**HISTORY P2** 

**FEBRUARY/MARCH 2012** 

**ADDENDUM** 

This addendum consists of 12 pages.

### QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE FALL OF COMMUNISM IN THE SOVIET UNION INFLUENCE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER 1989?

#### **SOURCE 1A**

The source focuses on Gorbachev's intentions regarding the policy of perestroika. Taken from <a href="http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1079/is\_n2153\_v89/ai\_8528187">http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1079/is\_n2153\_v89/ai\_8528187</a>.

Gorbachev initiated his new policy of perestroika and its intended radical reforms in 1989. The new policy of 'reconstruction' was introduced in an attempt to overcome the economic stagnation by creating a dependable and an effective mechanism to accelerating economic and social progress.

According to Gorbachev perestroika was the 'conference of development of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative and creative endeavour, improved order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our society'. It has the utmost respect for the individual freedom and consideration for personal dignity.

However, many of his reforms were considered radical at the time by orthodox (conservatives) like Boris Yeltsin.

#### **SOURCE 1B**

This article highlights how the collapse of communism influenced reforms in South Africa.

Taken from *The Times*, by M Binyon, 14 November 2009.

Mr Gorbachev was never a visionary or a revolutionary. He thought that communism could be reformed through his two guiding principles of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reconstruction). He hoped communism would evolve into a kind of social democracy. At home his experiments ended in his political fall.

Mr De Klerk, also no radical, was more able to keep control, because even fellow Afrikaners realised that the economic reasons for segregation no longer made sense. He declared that it was only the fall of the Berlin Wall that emboldened (gave courage or confidence to) his party to take the risk of releasing Mr Mandela. For years South Africans had feared that communist infiltration (to get into) of the African National Congress would mean an inevitable victory for communism if it were legalised and came to power. 'The ANC would come in on a platform of racial equality. We thought it would then be overtaken by a communist coup (overthrow),' he said.

Only when it was clear that communism was no longer a world force, did the National Party speed up negotiations with the prisoners on Robben Island that led, in 1990, three months after the fall of the Wall, to Mr Nelson Mandela's release.

#### **SOURCE 1C**

The following extract focuses on the impact of De Klerk's reforms on the ANC. Taken from *The Man In His Time* by W de Klerk, the brother of FW de Klerk.

In ANC ranks FW de Klerk's speech caused a good deal of confusion. The ANC had been caught on the wrong foot. They had expected Mandela's release, but not the unbanning of the organisation itself. In fact, their planned strategy was to use the released Mandela for a massive campaign to demand the unbanning of the ANC.

... from being part of the 'struggle', it [ANC] had suddenly become part of the 'system' ... From being an organised underground army it had been converted overnight into a public organisation. Where it had basked (depended) in foreign applause (approval) for its fight against apartheid, the ANC was plunged into the democratic political process ...

### QUESTION 2: HOW DID THE ENDING OF THE COLD WAR CONTRIBUTE TO THE RE-IMAGINING OF EGYPT DURING THE 1990s?

#### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON EGYPT**

In June 1953 Egypt became a republic under the leadership of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser. In 1970 Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser. He brought about a shift in Egyptian-Soviet relations. Sadat turned to America for aid but was pressurised by the US president, Jimmy Carter, to recognise Israel. In response Egyptian hardliners assassinated Sadat because of his strong links with the West. Hosni Mubarak took up the leadership of Egypt in 1981 and re-established ties with the Soviet Union. However, by the 1990s, cultural, economic and political relations were consolidated with the Soviet Union because it embraced democracy.

#### **SOURCE 2A**

This source focuses on the implications of the economic reform programme in Egypt after the fall of communism.

Taken from a discussion paper written by M Omran for the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) in 2002.

As economic reform programmes became the new trend of the last two decades, Egypt, like most developing countries, also experimented with the same programme. It aimed to achieve economic stabilisation by late 1990. A well-tailored economic reform programme, with full support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, was implemented to cover the whole economic spectrum. The programme was aimed at improving both monetary and economic policy, as Egypt suffered from hyperinflation (more than 20%), negative real interest rates (-6%), and huge budget deficit (20%). The IMF favoured quick implementation, but the Egyptian government wanted a gradual approach in order to minimise negative impacts of living standards of its society and programmes were introduced slowly.

#### **SOURCE 2B**

This source consists of two extracts which focuses on attempts at developing the Egyptian economy after 1990.

## **EXTRACT 1: This extract deals with Hosni Mubarak's attempt to restructure the Egyptian economy.**

Taken from http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/may2004.egyp-m05.html.

To obtain loans Egypt adopted a series of economic reform and structural adjustment programmes from 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union confirmed the impossibility of pursuing autarkic (self sufficient) national development in a world economy. A key aspect of the adjustment programmes was the reduction in food subsidies that were seen as misleading the market value of goods. Only subsidies on wheat, oil and oil products and sugar remained. Since then the cost to the consumer of most subsidised goods has gradually increased, with the price of flour and bread approaching their market cost.

With the announcement that food vouchers will be available for 25 staple foods, the government policy of abolishing (ending) subsidies has been destroyed. Although the vouchers will only be available to those who claimed them in 1989 and renewed their eligibility every year, it is a sign of the poverty in Egypt. The government reckons 88% of the population were entitled to them.

The vouchers will not be available to anyone who earns more than 2 000 Egyptian pounds, owns more than 11 acres of land or has more than one car. Naturally it will not include the 1% of the population who own most of Egypt's wealth and who have been the greatest benefactors of the adjustment plan ...

### EXTRACT 2: This extract recounts the experiences of Egyptians during the economic crises.

Taken from http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/may2004.egyp-m05.html.


Recounting those days ... Hagga Fawzia told the *Egyptian Gazette* in April this year, 'As soon as my first child was born, we registered him as one of the people entitled to goods listed on the card'. As her family grew to seven children, Fawzia continued, 'each of my children carried his favourite item. One took sugar, another the rice and a third struggled with the cooking oil. I used to make them sweets every time we got the sugar on the ration cards'.

Engineer Zeinab Mohamed also told the *Gazette*, 'I will always remember the top quality goods we used to buy with the ration card ... Nowadays the goods available at the state-run cooperative retail outlets are not as good as nearly 40 years ago ...'

### **SOURCE 2C**

This cartoon published in 2010 portrays the wealth that Hosni Mubarak had acquired during his reign as Egyptian president. Mubarak ruled Egypt during the period when it re-imagined itself. He was therefore responsible for the accumulation of '\$70 billion of corrupt wealth' and the economic mismanagement of Egypt after 1990.

Taken from http://www.cartoonstock.com/newscartoons/mfn/lowres/mfnn+1481.jpg.



OKAY! I'M GOING!!! BUT IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO REMOVE MY PERSONAL THINGS

• • •

# QUESTION 3: HOW WAS THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA THREATENED BY CONFLICT AND TENSION IN THE EARLY 1990s?

#### **SOURCE 3A**

This source highlights how conflict threatened the process of negotiations in South Africa during the 1990s.

Taken from Mandela, They Fought for Freedom Series by K Pampallis.

It seemed that the unbanning of the political organisations and the release of Mandela and the others had lit a fire under South Africa. A huge pot was beginning to cook, and it looked like it might boil over. There were a lot of ingredients in the pot — moderate white people who were worried about losing their comfortable lifestyle, rightwing white nationalists who were determined not to accept majority rule, black radicals who thought that the only way to gain freedom was to drive white people out of the country, Zulu nationalists who were set on having power in their own part of the country and many others.

Whenever there was a bit of progress in the negotiations, there seemed to be another riot or massacre somewhere in the country. Often, there were reports that the police or the army were either helping the violence to happen, or not doing anything about it when they could. The pot got hotter.

#### **SOURCE 3B**

The following two extracts were collected by journalist R Mkhondo in *Reporting South Africa* during his search for information regarding the violence in Sebokeng.

## EXTRACT 1: The extract below focuses on the police's account of what occurred in Sebokeng during 1992.

In Sebokeng hostel four local residents were found dead one August morning. Three died of stab wounds and one was burnt to death. Residents accused Zulu migrant workers living in the hostel of murdering the men. The police were questioning about 150 hostel dwellers about the four murders when [they] arrived and saw about 1 000 township residents gathering outside the hostel. The residents were armed with dangerous weapons and petrol bombs were displayed by many in the crowd. The mob openly declared to the police that they were there to enter the hostel and kill the people responsible for murdering the four men. A defence force contingent (unit) was called. Shooting broke out. Bloody battles erupted and 36 people were killed by soldiers, a police statement said later.


### EXTRACT 2: The extract below focuses on the residents' view of what occurred in Sebokeng during 1992.

The residents' version was quite different. They said soon after the marching and chanting residents arrived to demand the release of the men's bodies, soldiers arrived, got off their trucks, took up positions, and cocked their guns. The crowd came towards them waving their hands, saying 'peace, we are not fighting'. Some of them even sat down. All of a sudden there was shooting. Many of the people ran. Some of the people fell. When it was all over, 11 bodies were found, some outside and some inside the hostel compound. Hours later the death toll soared past 36.

#### **SOURCE 3C**

During the 1990s, while the process of negotiations was underway, there were a number of random incidents of political violence. The cartoon below depicts political violence that involved the killing of train commuters in the greater Vaal Triangle area, Johannesburg during 1991 and 1992.


Taken from Nelson Mandela – A Life in Cartoons. Edited by H Dugmore et al.



### **SOURCE 3D**

The graph below shows the deaths in political violence in South Africa from 1985 to 1993.

Taken from South Africa 1948 – 1994 by M Roberts.



## QUESTION 4: WHAT ROLE DID THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) PLAY IN DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S

#### **SOURCE 4A**


The extract below is taken from *Truth Justice Memory*, compiled by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in 2008. It explains the purpose of the TRC.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) ... was always bound to be controversial. It was also cathartic (healing), not just for those who came before it, but also for others who watched its proceedings. It was not about justice, though many Africans who had suffered under apartheid must have found this difficult to understand, but about reconciliation by persuading people to admit their crimes against their fellows.

#### **SOURCE 4B**

This is a cartoon by Zapiro which appeared in the *Sunday Times* on 2 August 1998. It depicts the amnesty process of the TRC.

Taken from Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 Years On by F du Toit.



#### **SOURCE 4C**

This source is a result of a survey of the views of 3 727 randomly selected ordinary South Africans carried out in 2000 and 2001.

Taken from The Truth about Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa by J Gibson.

Vast racial differences exist in how people evaluate the TRC, with the extremes being defined by blacks and whites. For instance, while roughly three-quarters of black South Africans approve of the work of the commission, only slightly more than one-third of whites are so inclined. Coloured respondents hold fairly negative views towards the TRC, although they are not as critical as whites, and Asian respondents tend to be relatively positive, although not as favourable as blacks. The task on which the TRC is most charitably (kindly) rated is that of helping the families of the victims to find out what happened to their loved ones – uncovering the truth about the past. A majority of South Africans of every race agrees that the TRC has done a very good job on this function. The least positive aspect of the truth and reconciliation process has to do with compensation, although even on this difficult issue, a majority of black and Asian South Africans rate the TRC positively. In general, it appears that blacks are positive toward all aspects of the work of the TRC, while whites judge nearly all of the TRC's work negatively.

#### **SOURCE 4D**

The following extract is from a foreword by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Taken from *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report.* 

We are deeply grateful to the thousands of South Africans who came to the Commission to tell us their stories. They have won our country the admiration of the world: wherever one goes, South Africa's peaceful transition to democracy, culminating (ending) in the truth and reconciliation process, is spoken of almost in reverent (respectful) tones, as a phenomenon (event) that is unique in the annals (records) of history, one to be commended as a new way of living for humankind. I regret that at the time of writing we owe so much by way of reparations (payment) to those who have been declared victims. The healing of those who came to us does hinge on their receiving more substantial reparations and I would be very deeply distressed if our country were to let down those who had the magnanimity (fairness) and generosity of spirit to reveal their pain in public.

I appeal to the Government that we meet this solemn obligation and responsibility, and I should like to express appreciation that the Minister of Finance has made it clear that he still regards reparations as unfinished business.

It is something of a pity that, by and large, the white community failed to take advantage of the truth and reconciliation process. They were badly let down by their leadership. Many of them carry a burden of a guilt which would have been lessened had they actively embraced the opportunities offered by the Commission; those who do not consciously acknowledge any sense of guilt are in a sense worse off than those who do. Apart from the hurt that it causes to those who suffered, the denial by so many white South Africans that they even benefited from apartheid is a crippling, self-inflicted blow to their capacity to enjoy and appropriate the fruits of change. But mercifully there have been glorious exceptions.

#### NSC - Addendum

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Binyon, M. The Times, November 14, 2009

Bottaro, J. et al. 2007. *In Search of History – Grade 12* (Britain; Oxford University Press)

Christie, K. 2000. *The South African Truth Commission* (Cape Town; Palgrave Publishers)

Claire, H. et al. 2007. *Making History – Grade 12* (Sandton; Heinemann Publishers Pty Ltd)

De Klerk, W. 1991. The Man in his Time – FW de Klerk (Cape Town; Jonathan Ball)

Dlamini, N. et al. 2007. Shuters History Grade 12 (PMB; Shuter & Shooters Publishers) Du Toit, F. et al. 2006. Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 Years On (Cape Town; David Philip)

Dugmore, C. et al. 2007. Viva History – Grade 12 (Florida Hills; Vivlia Publishers)

Dugmore, H. et al. 1999. *Nelson Mandela A Life in Cartoons* (Cape Town; David Philip) Friedman, M. et al. 2007. *Focus on History Looking into Past Grade 12* (Cape Town; Maskew Miller Longman)

Gibson, J. The Truth about Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa

Govender, SP. et al. 2007. *New Generation History Grade 12* (Pinetown; New Generation Publishing Enterprises)

Graves, F. et al. 2007. Moments in History (Cape Town; Juta Gariep)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail\_Gorbachev#Perestroika

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m1079/is n2153 v89/ai 8528187

http://www.cartoonstock.com/newscartoons/mfn/lowres/mfnn+1481.jpg

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/may2004.egyp-m05.shtml

Institute of Justice and Reconciliation: *Truth Justice Memory: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Process* (Cape Town; Tandym Print)

Meiring, P. 1999. Chronicle of the Truth Commission: A Journey through the past and present – into the future of South Africa (Pretoria; Carpe Diem Books)

Mkhondo, R. 1993. Reporting South Africa (Oxford; James Currey Publishers,)

Morris, M. 2004. Every Step of the Way: The Journey to Freedom in South Africa (London; Cambridge

Omran, M. 2002. Wider – Discussion Paper – Testing for a Significant Change in the Egyptian Economy under the Economic Reform Programme Era (United Nations University)

Pampallis, K. Mandela, They Fought for Freedom Series

Roberts, M. 2001. South Africa 1948–1994 (London; Maskew Miller Longman)

Sparks, A. 1994. *Tomorrow is Another Country* (Pretoria; Struik Publishers)

Tutu, D. 2000. *No Future without Forgiveness* (Cape Town; Juta Gariep) University Press)